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PAGES: 74 
The institution of disability, as it is perceived in the United States and most of Western 
civilization, signifies a site of oppression that has been historically neglected if not actively 
rejected by the hegemonic population of nondisabled people. While disability studies has 
congregated as a concerted effort of academic inquiry, scholars have largely approached 
disability from cultural and sociological perspectives and have focused on physical rather 
than cognitive disabilities. The field of rhetoric, as the study of discourse and its relation to 
the production and reception of meaning, offers vital perspectives for better understanding 
the institution of disability and may serve as a framework for first illuminating and then 
disempowering the discursive structures that have heretofore suggested that people with 
disabilities are deviant and inferior. This exposition aims to trace how and in what contexts 
the concept of disability has been formed as a rhetorical object via Foucauldian discourse 
analysis. The findings of this research elucidate how the disabled person has come to be 
known as a subject of the domain of disability through discursive knowledge-power 
relations. Though a rhetorical analysis may not alleviate the physical, intellectual, or 
emotional obstacles that may occur from the phenomena of disability, this project 
represents one step toward reshaping the oppressive paradigm of cultural thought regarding 
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The Rhetoric of Disability: A Foucauldian Discourse Analysis  
 
Significance 
The goal of many scholars’ academic inquiry has been to illuminate social 
injustice, political malpractice, and cultural inequity for many diverse sites of oppression, 
including race, gender, sexuality, and class. The institution of disability, until recent 
decades, has been historically excluded from this conversation. Disability studies as a 
distinct field of intellectual exploration has helped to recognize the disability community 
as a marginalized social group worthy of research and criticism. However, there is 
considerable ground to cover before completely destigmatizing and recalibrating our 
culture’s perspective of disability and treatment of disabled people. I argue that the field 
of rhetoric can and should further this discussion, as it is my belief that many of the 
unjust practices and perspectives surrounding the institution of disability stem from the 
formation of disability as a rhetorical object, which has subsequently subjugated certain 
bodies and minds and hierarchized the human population. A rhetorical analysis of the 
structures that name, organize, and govern differently formed bodies and minds, and thus 
exercise power over those bodies, is therefore necessary first to understand the 
knowledge systems that have constructed the oppressive dichotomy of human ability and 
worth, and then to open up the rhetorical situation in order to accommodate new, 
inclusive rhetorics.  
 The advent of disability studies as a legitimized field of academic research 
reflects a cultural awakening—one that is long overdue, yet still far from completely 
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shifting the paradigm of cultural thought. The injustices of the institution of disability did 
not emerge suddenly, however, bringing with it an urgent need and a problem to solve. 
The term disability as a linguistic marker of physical or cognitive difference is not a 
newly formed designation, but its cultural and social implications have shifted across 
both time and space. That is to say, disability as a symbol of identity signifies different 
meanings in different cultures at different moments in history. According to Lennard 
Davis, one of the earliest and foremost scholars in the field, “For centuries, people with 
disabilities have been an oppressed and repressed group… [who have been] isolated, 
incarcerated, observed, written about, operated on, instructed, implanted, regulated, 
treated, institutionalized, and controlled to a degree probably unequal to that experienced 
by any other minority group” (xv). However, such treatment of people with disabilities 
has not always been considered a form of oppression or repression, likely based on the 
inhumane assumption that a disabled individual is a defective version of a human, rather 
than a person.  
Beyond the scope of the academic study of disability, it is important to note that 
bodily values have always remained in flux, shifting across cultures and eras. Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson traces some of these shifts and found that, “Aristotle, Cicero, Pliny, 
Augustine, Bacon, and Montaigne account for such disruptions of the seemingly natural 
order in their interpretive schema… for these fathers of Western thought, the differently 
formed body is most often evidence of God’s design, divine wrath, or nature’s 
abundance, but it is always an interpretive occasion” (“From Wonder” 1). Garland-
Thomson further exemplifies later instances of changing bodily values, such as sixteenth 
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century European royalty keeping people with differently formed bodies as pets and 
Renaissance English stage performances employing actors with cleft palates and missing 
fingers to function as metaphors of lewd talk and idleness (2). Scientific inquiry then 
began to dissect and display anatomical anomalies, paving the way for the 
commodification and pseudo-celebration of differently formed bodies at P.T. Barnum’s 
infamous American Museum and circus. At any given cultural moment, whether the 
disabled body is celebrated or shamed, it is always regarded as exceptional or separate. 
As Garland-Thomson concludes, “Even though the discourses of the anomalous body 
comprise a series of successive reframings within a variety of registers over time, the 
uneasy human impulse to textualize, to contain, to explain our most unexpected corporeal 
manifestations to ourselves has remained constant” (2). The differently formed body, 
now most commonly referred to as the disabled body, while only recently regarded as a 
subject worthy of academic study and representation, is not a new emergence.  
Jay Dolmage, a prominent rhetorician who has made significant contributions to 
the discussion of disability, argues that technology has catalyzed the need to reconsider 
bodily values, especially from a rhetorical standpoint. From one perspective, advances in 
artificial intelligence and machinery have redefined the limits of the human body by 
creating devices and treatments that can mimic its many functions without altering one’s 
daily life. In this light, perfection of the body is achievable. From another perspective, 
however, “so many of the technologies that suggest to us that we are perfectible, that 
intensify our dedication to norms, have been invented specifically because we are not 
normal” (Dolmage 2). Disability, then, is not new. Technological advancements, 
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however, have reintroduced the limits and the norms of the human body and how we 
determine and disseminate their meanings, which I contend is best theorized from a 
rhetorical perspective. 
Before disability studies gained footing in academic circles, people with 
disabilities began to unite first as a physical minority community, which has been linked 
to the political victory of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990. This act, 
though a step towards equality that guarantees civil rights for people with disabilities, did 
not necessarily alter the cultural or political landscape. As Davis reports, the 
unemployment rate for disabled people remains high if not higher than before the act, as 
it “has no enforcement mechanism or agency, so it relies on individuals bringing lawsuits 
on their own—a method that for most people with disabilities is not a practical remedy” 
(xvii). Despite these deficiencies, the ADA did function as the catalyst for directing 
attention to the legal and civil inequities for this minority community, which has slowly 
manifested in current academic discussions and socio-political activism. Beyond the 
ADA, the visibility of the disability social movement has led to widespread change, 
“including the deinstitutionalization of thousands of people incarcerated in nursing homes 
and hospitals world-wide… the retrofitting of government offices and public facilities to 
make them more physically accessible; the redesign of urban landscapes; closed 
captioning on late-model televisions; and the growing recognition that disabled people 
constitute a marginalized and disenfranchised constituency” (“Foucault, 
Governmentality” 2). While disability studies now exists, though limited to special topics 
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panels at national conferences and one-week sections of course syllabi, the fight for 
recognition and justice for this minority community has been hard-won.  
Discrimination and prejudice against people with disabilities are only a few of the 
simple explanations for the oppression and marginalization of this community. A more 
complex explanation for the stigmatization of this community, however, lies in how 
“disability has been seen as eccentric, therapeutically oriented, out-of-the-mainstream, 
and certainly not representative of the human condition—not as race, class, or gender 
seem representative of that condition” (Davis xv). Unlike other minority communities 
that have been studied and represented in public spheres and academic discussions, 
disability as a subject of careful analysis has been neglected if not actively rejected. 
Davis remarks that “while race, for example, has become in the past twenty years a more 
than acceptable modality from which to theorize in the classroom and in print, a 
discourse, a critique, and a political struggle, disability has continued to be relegated to 
hospital hallways, physical therapy tables, and remedial classrooms” (xv). Despite 
resistance from the academy and from the general public, disability studies has finally 
gained stature and developed a discursive methodology for studying not just the corporeal 
disabled body but also the social, political, and cultural representations and constructions 
of the disabled body and its relation to society. As every human inhabits a body, every 
human can benefit from the study of the body, including “the ways that the body in its 
variations is metaphorized, disbursed, promulgated, commodified, cathected, and de-
cathected, normalized, abnormalized, formed, and deformed” (Davis xvi). Though 
Disability studies centers on the experience of people with disabilities, all people may 
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benefit from the exploration of the human condition. Even further, Ladelle McWhorter 
argues that “the various labels used to mark out individuals as ‘abnormal’ or 
‘handicapped’ are ones that not only could be applied to you tomorrow, maybe following 
a cardiovascular accident or train wreck; in fact one or more of them almost certainly will 
be applied to you at some point in your life if you live very long, and they probably will 
also be applied to someone you care deeply about” (xv). Disability certainly encompasses 
genetic conditions, but is unique in its fluidity. Any person may become disabled at any 
time, which renders the study of this phenomenon urgent and necessary.  
As Simi Linton argues, the exigency of recognizing disabled people as an 
oppressed group warrants a broad-based intellectual inquiry that traces and analyzes the 
innumerable manifestations of disability in language and culture (539). While disability 
studies has congregated as a concerted effort of academic research, scholars have largely 
approached disability from cultural and sociological perspectives and have focused on 
physical rather than cognitive disabilities. The field of rhetoric, as the study of discourse 
and its relation to the production and reception of meaning, may offer vital perspectives 
for better understanding the institution of disability. More specifically, a rhetorical 
analysis of disability can serve as a framework for first illuminating and then 
disempowering the discursive structures that have heretofore suggested that people with 
disabilities are deviant and inferior. 
If rhetoric is the tool by which we make meaning and disseminate meaning, it is 
therefore necessary to analyze rhetorically how concepts have surfaced and determined 
meaning, connotatively and denotatively. As the forthcoming analysis will explore, 
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disability, as an institution, is a cultural construct that is shaped not only by a medical 
description of bodily difference but by a network of fluctuating rhetorical structures and 
discursive practices. As a result of the current scholarship that approaches disability from 
sociological and cultural perspectives, many policies and procedures have shifted and 
continue to shift to create more inclusive, diverse environments and spaces that are 
physically and cognitively accommodating—from sidewalks and ramps to sensory-
sensitive rooms. However, little attention has been given to the rhetorical formation of 
disability—which has shaped our understanding of disability and ultimately influences 
the relations among disabled and nondisabled people. While I endorse such physical 
changes to classrooms, workplaces, and public spaces, I believe that a close rhetorical 
analysis is necessary to promote a more nuanced understanding of the term disability as a 
discursive formation rather than a symbol of deviance and inferiority and to take steps in 
eradicating its stigma.  
As Jay Dolmage contends, “A ‘futuristic’ disability studies will not be about 
eradication of disability, but about new social structures and relations, made possible by 
new rhetorics” (2). The academic discussion concerning disability is active and 
meaningful, but little scholarship exists that primarily attributes the oppression and 
inequity that exists within the disability community to the way that we understand and 
discuss disability. It is my primary purpose, then, to approach disability rhetorically by 
way of Foucauldian discourse analysis. In “The Order of Discourse,” Foucault provides 
the hypothesis that “in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, 
selected, organized, and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to 
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ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its 
ponderous, formidable materiality” (1461). Foucault’s hypothesis holds true within the 
rhetoric of disability, whose discourse has formed the very term disability, designated 
who is disabled and who is not, and wrangled within its grasp the rights, privileges, 
dichotomies, and social hierarchies of human ability. This exposition is not intended to 
designate what bodies or minds are disabled according to the modern definitions of 
disability; instead, it is intended to disentangle the discursive exercise of power that has 
unjustly constructed the social institution of disability with Foucauldian discourse 
analysis as the critical apparatus. By analyzing these rhetorical structures, we may better 
understand the power of discourse in shaping culture and identities by demonstrating its 
role in constructing the institution of disability; additionally, this analysis will aim to 
make way for more inclusive and equitable perspectives of disability by means of 
inclusive, equitable rhetorics.  
Secondly, I argue that a major rift within disability studies is the exclusion of 
cognitive, or intellectual, disability, which is echoed by the normed constructions of the 
rhetor and the interlocutor within the field of rhetoric. As Lennard Davis defines it, 
“Disability studies aims to challenge the received in its most simple form—the body—
and in its most complex form—the construction of the body” (xviii). While in some 
contexts the study of the body encompasses the study of the mind, much of the current 
scholarship implicates disability as an effect of a differently formed body but not a 
differently formed mind. At the same time, the field of rhetoric has neglected to consider 
the constraints of a rhetor or interlocutor with a differently formed mind. In both fields, 
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intellect has been overlooked or neglected, assumed to be functioning at the same 
capacity as rhetors without disabilities. As a result, the population of people who cannot 
participate in conventional discourse have been further marginalized, even by those 
dedicated to increasing representation of the disability community. If the field of rhetoric 
re-examines the role of the rhetor for people with intellectual and/or cognitive disabilities 
whose discourse and meaning-making ability diverges from the normed rhetorical 
situation, we may begin to accommodate people who have been denied agency and voice.  
As the forthcoming analysis will explicate, humanity’s historical need to 
contextualize that which diverges from what is considered normal has affirmed the 
exceptional body as something that must be understood and contained. It is within this 
struggle to control the experience of the differently formed body that disability has 
emerged as a word, a concept, and an identity marker which warrants rhetorical analysis. 
As Foucault argues, “It is not easy to say something new; it is not enough for us to open 
our eyes, to pay attention, or to be aware, for new objects suddenly to light up and 
emerge out of the ground” (1439). Disability did not light up and emerge from the ground 
waiting to be named disability. Rather, the institution of disability has emerged “under 
the positive conditions of a complex group of relations” (1439). In other words, the 
discursive tropes, largely enacted by the hegemony of nondisabled people, have created 
what we understand as the institution of disability and designated what bodies and minds 
fit within its parameters. History exemplifies that the differently formed body does not 
directly correlate to a static paradigm of physical dimensions. Bodily values are culturally 
contingent and era-specific, which bolsters the notion that the institution of disability is a 
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complex web of socially constructed meanings and discursive tropes. A rhetorical 
analysis of these discursive tropes will not only contribute to the objective of disability 
studies—to push back against the repression and oppression of people with disabilities—
but will also demonstrate the meaning-making power of discourse in organizing our 



















Survey of Scholarship 
To understand the complexities of the social institution of disability and its 
implications for the field of rhetoric, it is necessary first to understand the lexical roots of 
the term disability in the concept of normalcy. Lennard Davis, a pioneer of disability 
studies, contends in "Constructing Normalcy: The Bell Curve, the Novel, and the 
Invention of the Disabled Body in the Nineteenth Century" that "the 'problem' is not the 
person with disabilities; the problem is the way that normalcy is constructed to create the 
'problem' of the disabled person" (3). Constructing and enforcing normalcy, according to 
Davis, is learned and passed down through positive representations of normal characters 
and negative representations of non-normal characters in media. The term normal, 
however, meaning to conform or to remain standard or regular, did not enter European 
languages until 1855 and stems from the social constructions surrounding 
industrialization and material production (3). Applying the norm to human bodies 
resulted from French statistician Adolph Quetelet's application of astronomy's "law of 
error" to the measuring of human dimensions, which spiraled into an image of the 
average man and enabled a hierarchy of physical and moral attributes (4). What is most 
concerning about the etymology of normalcy and its inscription in our language is its ties 
to eugenics. Imagining a normal or average human body subsequently labels any non-
conforming body as a deviance, which eugenicists would argue is undesirable and should 
be prevented, cured, or disposed of. Davis's primary contention is that culture's 
responsibility is not necessarily to solve the problems of disability but to reconfigure 
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what is considered normal and what is deviant and to understand how our labeling of 
these categories is flawed.  
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson agrees that we must reconfigure the meaning of and 
our perceptions of bodies and identity and that we must start by "reframing 'disability' as 
another culture-bound, physically justified difference to consider along with race, gender, 
class, ethnicity, and sexuality" (“Disability, Identity” 5). Much like these other sites of 
oppression, disability as a cultural construct is formed and perpetuated by social forces 
that designate certain bodies as deviant. Even further, Garland-Thomson argues that the 
fluidity of disability, meaning anyone can become disabled at any time, is "[more] 
threatening to those who identify themselves as normates than such seemingly more 
stable marginal identities as femaleness, blackness, or nondominant ethnic identities" 
(14). Garland-Thomson’s coined term “normate” is the social positioning in which bodies 
that are generally accepted as standard—free from any stigmatized identity markers—can 
exercise power and authority over deviant minority groups. However, Garland-Thomson 
finds that "if one attempts to define the normate position by peeling away all the marked 
traits within the social order at this historical moment, what emerges is a very narrowly 
defined profile that describes only a minority of actual people" (8). 
Essentially, the normate is a fantasy image of perfect health, beauty, and functioning and 
is impossible to achieve.  
The intersectionality of disability as an identity marker with other sites of 
oppression has led to much scholarship focused on this specific overlap. One particular 
 lens is that of Crip theory, pioneered by Robert McRuer, which reclaims the term cripple 
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and aims to incorporate disability as a fluid element of identity that can intersect with 
other diverse groups rather than an isolated label. In "Compulsory Able-Bodiedness  and 
Queer/Disabled Existence," McRuer draws parallels specifically between marginalized 
sexuality and disability, arguing that "able-bodiedness, even more than heterosexuality, 
still largely masquerades as a nonidentity, as the natural order of things" (1). Crip theory 
as a focused academic study of overlapping marginalized identities 
draws important parallels between ability and sexuality, but, according to Chris Bell, the 
intersectionality of disability and other stigmatized identities is still largely 
underrepresented. In “Introducing White Disability Studies: A Modest Proposal,” Bell 
criticizes many of the seminal works published by disability studies scholars, including 
Lennard Davis and Simi Linton, and argues that in the current moment, disability studies 
prioritizes the white experience.  Though many sites of oppression intersect with the 
disability experience, Bell argues that “Disability Studies claims to examine the 
experiences of a vast number of disabled people, yet the form that representation takes is, 
far too often, a white one” (278).    
Despite the internal debates within the field, disability studies has rooted itself 
within the academic community. Simi Linton, an early activist of the movement, 
aggregates the linguistic conventions of disability within language in “Reassigning 
Meaning” and ultimately finds that the term disability reveals an oppressive network of 
social, political, and cultural structures rather than a denotative marker of physical or 
mental impairment. This network surfaces in the naming of and description of people 
with disabilities. Most notable are the ways in which various terminology is used by 
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disabled people and non-disabled people. Phrases such as physically challenged and 
"handicapable," according to Linton, represent the intention to speak politely of people 
with disabilities. However, such polite words effectively infantilize disabled people and 
imply that a disabled person’s value is contingent on the validation of a nondisabled 
person. Other terms treat disability with less feigned politeness, such as describing a 
person as afflicted with, suffering from, or victim of. Like the latter phrases of physically 
challenged or “handicapable,” these descriptors are not necessarily malicious or 
intentionally condescending. Even so, Linton claims that these linguistic structures 
“[attribute] life, power, and intention to the condition and [disempower] the person with 
the disability, rendering him or her helpless and passive” (169). In both groupings, it is 
revealed that these common discursive tropes neither blatantly condemn people with 
disabilities, nor label them as sinful or immoral as past civilizations have. Nevertheless, 
these descriptors do construct a hierarchy, which keeps disabled people linguistically 
dependent on a hegemonic class of non-disabled people in order to define themselves. 
Other terms, such as cripple, gimp, or freak, are currently undergoing a form of 
reclamation as people with disabilities have begun to use them with ownership in order to 
transgress the terms’ negative connotations. Even further, the linguistic structure of 
disability can only exist in opposition to ability, which Linton extends to the absolute 
categories of normal and abnormal, as each of which depends on the other for meaning 
and stability (168).  It is not enough, however, to deconstruct the morphology of 
disability and point out the connotation of the prefix “dis-” as meaning separate and 
deviant; instead of choosing a new name for disability, it is necessary to reassign its 
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meaning. For Linton, this process requires the promotion of disability studies as a 
legitimate field of academic inquiry with the goal of defining disability as a culturally 
bound institution rather than a descriptor of impairment or biological difference.  
Furthermore, Linton asserts in “What is Disability Studies?” that disability studies 
must be regarded differently than disability services. Disability studies, as a focused 
inquiry of the social structures and linguistic conventions of disability, “is studying the 
social, cultural, political phenomenon of disability as a construct, not the implementation 
of services for people with disabilities” (526). While individual interventions and access 
to accommodations certainly influence and are influenced by the study of the 
phenomenon of disability, disability studies as a liberal-arts based inquiry must direct its 
energy toward “[weaving] disabled people back into the fabric of society, thread by 
thread, theory by theory,” by means of examining primarily the social structures that have 
thus far rendered them separate and deviant.  
One of the current debates regarding exactly how to approach Linton’s proposed 
task circulates around the various conceptual models—or perspectives—of disability, 
which include the medical, moral, charity, economic, and social models. The social 
model places the moral responsibility on society to provide accommodations and to 
remove the burdens that have historically excluded people with disabilities. It has also 
been the most controversial.  Originating in the United Kingdom, it has been praised for 
countering the medical model of disability, which hinges on the need to cure the physical 
impairment rather than the cultural barriers. Additionally, the social model makes the 
distinction between disability—the structural and public social exclusion—and 
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impairment—the individual and private physical limitation (Shakespeare 198). However, 
many disability studies scholars have equally criticized the social model for its 
oversimplification and generalization of the disabled experience. Tom Shakespeare, 
sociologist, disability studies scholar, and person with a disability, argues in "The Social 
Model of Disability" that though the social model is a practical tool for absolving people 
with disabilities of many of the burdens of the disabled experience, it is simultaneously 
an exclusionary system of thought and action. Besides noting the problematic 
oversimplification of the social barriers of disability, Shakespeare further argues that the 
authors of the social model make up a small group of white heterosexual men, most of 
whom had physical impairments. In effect, the social model assumes a narrow view of 
disability and does not account for cognitive disabilities or the intersectionality of the 
disabled experience (200). Despite this debate, the social model has done much for 
reconfiguring the ways in which we understand and discuss disability in the public 
sphere. 
While these important voices in the disability studies movement have solidified 
the burgeoning field within academia, these studies have been conducted largely through 
sociological lenses and cultural perspectives. Disability studies, as a distinct field, has 
defined the parameters of the oppressive social forces of the institution of disability and 
decidedly stated that we can no longer accept them. Disability Studies can benefit, 
however, from the field of rhetoric in meaningful and important ways. In “The Roles of 
Rhetoric in Constructions and Reconstructions of Disability,” Kenneth Lindblom and 
Patricia Dunn argue that as rhetoricians, “we know better than to be satisfied with the 
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naming of categories, that is, philosophical statements of ‘being’ … we must move from 
acknowledgement of social constructions to action that informs a meaningful, public 
reconstruction of what counts as ‘normal’” (169). Rhetoricians have important tasks as 
scholars, teachers, and public intellectuals not only to produce rhetorical analyses of the 
institution of disability but also to include such scholarship in course curriculum and 
ultimately to engage in public spaces and discourse.  
In Disability Rhetoric, Jay Dolmage situates the ancient field of rhetoric within 
the framework of disability studies in order to reconfigure the role of the human body in 
discourse. For Dolmage, “Rhetoric needs disability studies as a reminder to pay critical 
and careful attention to the body [and] disability studies needs rhetoric to better 
understand and negotiate the ways that discourse represents and impacts the experience 
of disability” (3). Until this moment in the field of rhetoric, the body has largely been 
regarded as either a distraction to discourse or as an aide in conveying meaning, not a 
legitimate form of communication in and of itself. Dolmage regards the body as the 
vehicle through which all communication is generated, filtered, and delivered; in other 
words, rhetoric is always embodied. Specifically, Dolmage works to locate the body 
within rhetorical history, beginning with Periclean Athens after the Ten Years’ War and 
the Greek god Hephaestus whose feet were deformed. While soldiers returned from war 
with wounded bodies and the city lay in ruins, festivals were held to celebrate disabled 
Hephaestus as a symbol of both wartime service and creative industrialization to rebuild 
the city. Bodily values have since undergone several cultural shifts. Dolmage looks ahead 
to the future of the body as an impetus for pushing the boundaries of rhetoric, which in 
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more recent history has ignored the body due to “a fear of imperfection, a fear about the 
boundaries around our own bodies, and a fear of the strange bodies of Others” (5). The 
importance of the body for the study of rhetoric is refined by Tobin Siebers’s theory of 
complex embodiment, as laid out in Disability Theory. 
Sieber’s intervention in the large arena of theory, specifically regarding the 
structuralist view of language as representation, helps to unite rhetoric and disability 
studies by magnifying the bodily experience, not just the social institution of disability. 
According to Siebers, “Because linguistic structuralism tends to view language as the 
agent and never the object of representation, the body, whether abled or disabled, figures 
as a language effect rather than as a causal agent, excluding embodiment from the 
representational process almost entirely” (2). Many of the theorists who have contributed 
to disability studies have hyper-focused on the social institutions and forms of oppression 
that comprise disability and, consequently, have deemed the reality of the disabled bodily 
experience as immaterial. The theory of complex embodiment bridges the gap between 
the bodily experience of being disabled and the social ideologies of disability. For 
Siebers, this theory “understands disability as an epistemology that rejects the temptation 
to value the body as anything other than what it was and that embraces what the body has 
become and will become relative to the demands on it, whether environmental, 
representational, or corporeal” (27). Acknowledging the realities of the disabled body and 
studying its potential function as a rhetorical vehicle, as Jay Dolmage does, while also 
situating the body within the cultural framework of disability, as Tobin Siebers does, 
allows for a more precise and representative rhetorical analysis of disability.  
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The field of rhetoric has illuminated gaps in disability studies perspectives by 
serving as a framework for studying the body as a vehicle for discourse. While the body 
certainly should be rhetorically analyzed, the current conversation has further separated 
physical disability from mental or cognitive disability. As rhetoric opens up new avenues 
of thought for disability studies, it has simultaneously problematized its own field by 
drawing attention to the normed, non-inclusive construction of the rhetor. In another 
seminal work, Embodied Rhetorics: Disability in Language and Culture, James Wilson 
and Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson question the rhetorical canons as they assume a non-
disabled audience and author and build on normed constructions of delivery, invention, 
gesture, movement, and being (Yergeau). Embodied Rhetorics functions as a canonical 
reference work in the field of disability studies, especially regarding its intersection with 
rhetoric, but also reveals one of its major shortcomings. In Julie Vedder’s review of the 
book, she remarks:  
None of the essays, for instance, address mental disability. This lacuna 
marks the ways in which Disability Studies, and disability activist work 
more generally, too often grounds itself in a shared sense of intelligence as 
a strategy for undermining stereotypes about disability. If, despite a 
disability, I'm smart and articulate, then discrimination against me 
economically, politically, or socially is irresponsible and reprehensible. By 
effectively reproducing the mind/body split, disability activism and theory 
undermine the possibility of fighting for those with mental disabilities. 
(145) 
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As Jay Dolmage argues, disability studies needs rhetoric. However, rhetoric as a 
discipline reaches an impasse when faced with the reality of cognitive disabilities. If 
meaning is produced and interpreted through language, then rhetoric has excluded a 
portion of the human population from participating in the exchange of meaning, which 
precludes people with cognitive disabilities from exercising agency. In the effort to unite 
rhetoric and disability studies, scholarship has further marginalized people with cognitive 
disabilities. 
Melanie Yergeau, one of the foremost rhetoricians discussing disability, has 
helped to draw attention to the lack of representation for cognitive disabilities. In 
“Clinically Significant Disturbance: On Theorists Who Theorize Theory of Mind,” 
Yergeau discusses in an autoethnographic format the issues of the theory of mind, or 
ToM, as it pertains to rhetoric and to Yergeau’s own experience as an English faculty 
member with autism. In short, ToM posits that autistic people are considered to have an 
impaired theory of mind, and that they “do not understand that other people have their 
own unique mental states, lives, and experiences, [and] do not understand that other 
people know, want, feel, or believe things.” Furthermore, ToM, which has been accepted 
as empirical fact in psychology and cognitive studies, implies that autism signifies 
incommunicability, which excludes people with autism from functioning as either a 
rhetor or interlocutor. Yergeau expands this notion of the non-rhetor: 
I am bombarded by representations of autistic people as non-rhetors—as 
non-rhetors who cannot emote (goodbye pathos), as non-rhetors who 
cannot recognize the mental states nor visualize the needs of the people 
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around them (goodbye ethos), as non-rhetors whose logics are so 
mechanistic and rigid that their only comparable non-rhetor analogues are 
robots and chimpanzees (goodbye, logos). As a rhetorician, I am supposed 
to understand autism as a limit case, one that signifies everything that 
rhetoric is not. I am supposed to understand that autism is the antithesis of 
narrative. As a rhetorician, I am supposed to understand that autism 
prevents me from being a rhetorician.  
Yergeau’s scholarship helps to bridge the gap between rhetoric and disability studies and 
its disregard of mental, cognitive, and intellectual/developmental disabilities. Despite the 
oppressive forces that deem her a non-rhetor, she has opened up the dialogue for people 
with mental disabilities and forged a pathway for representation through scholarship. 
However, such avenues are not accessible for people with severe intellectual disabilities 
who cannot take part in the academic conversation or function as a rhetor through 
conventional means.  
"Rethinking Rhetoric through Mental Disabilities" by Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson 
addresses the criticism she faces for precluding scholarship on cognitive disabilities in 
her earlier work Embodied Rhetorics. To open the discussion, Lewiecki-Wilson questions 
how people with mental disabilities, encompassing mental illness, psychiatric disabilities, 
and severe intellectual disability, can exercise rhetorical agency and, even further, 
questions if and how a revised understanding of “rhetoricity” could improve the lives of 
people with disabilities (157). These questions build on the work of Brenda Jo 
Brueggeman, who primarily analyzes deafness and rhetoric. In Lend Me Your Ear, 
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Brueggeman admits the difficulties of disentangling deafness and rhetoric, which also 
makes it difficult “to separate the rhetorical tradition, the theory and practice of rhetoric 
for some 2,500 years now, from the ‘problems’ that deafness poses for a cultural 
imperative to speak and speak well” (Brueggemann 11). Brueggeman’s scholarship 
informs Lewiecki-Wilson’s analysis by pointing out the problem of the will to speech in 
rhetoric, which affects both deafness in Brueggeman’s analysis and mental disabilities 
that inhibit the ability to understand or to produce speech as in Lewiecki-Wilson’s 
analysis. For the latter, the rhetorical tradition and its emphasis on speaking well puts 
“emphasis on the individual rhetor who produces speech/writing, which in turn confirms 
the existence of a fixed, core self, imagined to be located in the mind” (Lewiecki-Wilson 
157). Adhering to this rhetorical tradition reduces the humanness of people with mental 
disabilities who cannot function as an orthodox rhetor.   
For Lewiecki-Wilson, granting “rhetoricity” to people with mental disabilities 
may not be through independence, productivity, or self-advocacy, as in many cases the 
reality of disability makes these unattainable paths for reaching equality. Instead, she 
argues, we should reevaluate “rhetoricity” by studying facilitated communication as 
rhetorical agency. Facilitated communication, or “mediated rhetoricity,” calls on Krista 
Ratcliffe’s notion of rhetorical listening, which involves “the active process of 
interpretation on the part of the audience, involving commitment and care to similarities 
and differences, to other cultural logics, and to ethically responsible action" (161). For 
people with mental disabilities who do not speak through facilitated communication, 
rhetorical listening can take the form of close attention to a disabled person’s bodily 
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movements, sounds, interests, and disinterests (161). Most importantly, “mediated 
rhetoricity” requires a caring advocate who observes closely the nonverbal performances 
of the disabled person’s everyday life and then “carefully and ethically co-constructs 
narratives and arguments from the perspective of the disabled person for the purpose of 
enhancing his or her daily life” (162). Lewiecki-Wilson’s article represents the awareness 
of the limits of rhetoric and addresses the need to reconfigure the role of speech in 
discourse. 
Disability studies has made strides in breaking down the abled/disabled binary 
and is slowly destigmatizing disability and eradicating the notion of a monolithic 
“normal.” However, current scholarship has examined disability primarily from cultural 
and sociological perspectives. While rhetoric has intervened and offered rhetorical 
studies of the body and embodied communication, little scholarship exists that regards 
the institution of disability as a purely rhetorical formation. Scholars have considered 
disability from rhetorical viewpoints but have not critically examined disability itself as a 
discursive formation. Furthermore, the fields of disability studies and rhetoric alike can 
benefit from a reevaluation of voice and agency of people with cognitive disabilities, 
which currently marginalizes rhetors whose discourse and meaning-making abilities 







Near the turn of the nineteenth century, Friedrich Nietzsche interrupted traditional 
rhetorical studies with a theoretical perspective of language as unnatural, daring so far as 
to label language a system of metaphors comprised of truth and lies. For Nietzsche, truth 
is “a movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of 
human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and 
embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and 
binding” (“On Truth” 1174). These truths, also referred to as illusions, are merely 
linguistic figurations of what we perceive to be reality, rather than a reflection of reality. 
Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg summarize Nietzsche’s notion of truth as “a social 
arrangement necessitated by the powerful tendency to tell lies… [and lies are] clearly an 
act of discourse, a misrepresentation of actual circumstances” (1169). What discourse has 
formed to be what we perceive as truths, according to Nietszche, are in fact lies, 
“metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force” (1174). 
The institution of disability in our current culture, with its beliefs, practices, and 
prejudices, epitomizes the crux of Nietzsche’s argument. Furthermore, Nietzsche posits, 
“There is obviously no unrhetorical ‘naturalness’ of language to which one could appeal; 
language itself is the result of purely rhetorical arts… language is rhetoric, because it 
desires to convey only a doxa [opinion], not an episteme [knowledge]” (“Ancient 
Rhetoric” 21). Rhetoric creates and determines the meaning of a concept, which 
according to much of postmodern rhetoric, largely influenced by Nietzsche, is always a 
socially constructed commentary on reality, influenced by rhetors’ own constraints. 
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As rhetoric constructs meaning, determines meaning, and negotiates meaning, it is 
engaged in the formation of concepts, the process by which the term disability has 
emerged linguistically as a definitive parameter of physical or cognitive functioning. This 
formation of concepts, according to Nietzsche, does not occur from simply correlating a 
unique thing with its predetermined unique name. Instead, a word forms a concept 
“insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases … which are 
never equal and thus altogether unequal” (“On Truth” 1174). In sum, words become 
concepts by way of aggregating unlike things. Nietzsche illustrates the process of 
forming concepts with the naming of the leaf:  
Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is 
certain that the concept ‘leaf’ is formed by arbitrarily discarding these 
individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects… 
[which implies] that, in addition to the leaves, there exists in nature the 
‘leaf’: the original model according to which all the leaves were perhaps 
woven, sketched, measured, colored, curled, and painted. (1174)  
Though every leaf, as a physical object rather than a concept in this instance, is unique 
and original, rhetoric allows for any physical object that has “leaf-like” qualities to be 
deemed a leaf. The word leaf, apart from its homonyms, denotes an appendage of a plant 
or tree and signifies a generally agreed upon set of characteristics and parameters, 
without question. While such formation of concepts, as it pertains to physical objects 
such as leaves, does not generally signify injustice, the formation of concepts as it 
pertains to humanity leads to problematic outcomes.  
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Disability, as a word turned concept, is engaged in a similar formation as leaf, in 
that it signifies a generally agreed upon set of characteristics and parameters of human 
ability. According to the consensus of many disability studies scholars, the institution of 
disability is not only a site of oppression because of physical barriers in nature, though 
those barriers are certainly one component, but also because the cultural formation of the 
disabled person depicts certain humans as deviant, defective, burdensome, and unwanted. 
While I do not deny the many physical obstacles for people with disabilities, which are 
real and valid, I argue that this cultural construction of disability has been formed and 
perpetuated by the rhetorical formation of concepts, which have constructed a flawed, 
unjust meaning of disability (Nietzsche refers to the formation of concepts, while 
Foucault refers to the formation of objects). To illustrate Nietzsche’s notion of the “will 
to power” as an underlying motive for human discourse, Bizzell and Herzberg explain 
that “gross displays of power, the recurrent attempts of individuals and groups to 
subjugate others, are only the most obvious manifestations [in addition to art, which is] 
the desire to gain control over chaotic experience” (1170). Rhetoric, which exercises 
itself in innumerable discursive art forms, aims to gain power over its audience and has 
been weaponized as a powerful tool in constructing the dichotomy of human ability and 
its subsequent hierarchy of human life.  
Nietzsche’s discussion of truth as a “rhetorical construction arising from the 
creative use of language to make an effective social arrangement” is extended and 
expanded by Michel Foucault’s theory of discourse analysis, which will serve as the 
critical apparatus of this exposition (1169). According to Bizzell and Herzberg, 
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Foucauldian discourse analysis “describes the relationship between language and 
knowledge; the functions of disciplines, institutions, and other discourse communities; 
the ways that particular statements come to have truth value; the constraints on the 
production of discourse about objects of knowledge; the effects of discursive practices on 
social action; and the uses of discourse to exercise power” (1433). In short, rhetoric—or, 
in Foucauldian terms, discourse—functions in part as a meaning-making currency that 
negotiates identities and arranges social hierarchies. For the purposes of this exposition, I 
argue that discourse has functioned in categorizing and arbitrarily naming certain bodies 
as disabled and has subsequently stigmatized and marginalized those bodies. However, 
Bizzell and Herzberg clarify that this ideology would “not deny the existence of 
phenomena but to say that what we know of them is a function of the needs or desires of 
society and institutions and of available methods (which may be different in different 
communities) of coming to know something” (1433). Foucauldian discourse analysis 
would not deny the existence of physical or cognitive conditions housed within the 
dichotomy of disability. Instead, it would argue that the meaning of disability and its 
cultural connotations have been constructed through discourse, largely by the hegemonic 
population of nondisabled people.   
To link the subjugation of people with disabilities to the discursive structures and 
practices that have strengthened and perpetuated this network of oppression, it is 
necessary first to trace Foucault’s influence on understanding the relations between 
power and knowledge. Regarding social change in general, Foucault’s scholarship has 
prompted reconsiderations of social systems that have long been considered obvious, 
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concrete, natural, and essential with regard to the historical conditions in which social 
systems were formed. Scholars have already begun to synthesize Foucault’s commentary 
on historical and epistemological formations within the current institution of disability 
with the intention to scrutinize its practices and ideas including rehabilitation, genetic 
counseling, special education, and accommodation (“Foucault, Governmentality” 3). 
Foucault’s influence has provided valuable insight for breaking down the once-held 
perspectives that disability (as an institution not a phenomenon) is fixed and inevitable. 
Though the sociological study of disability in general is a young field of inquiry, 
Foucault’s theories of relations between knowledge and power have surfaced as clear and 
practical critical apparatuses. However, the notion of disability as purely a rhetorical 
formation has not been considered as critically. A Foucauldian analysis of the rhetoric of 
disability is necessary to bridge the gap in current scholarship. Shelly Tremain insists, 
however, that any Foucauldian analysis of disability be rooted in the notion of power.  
Furthermore, Tremain asserts that Foucault’s conception of power, especially as it 
relates to knowledge, comes as a response to many of the questions that political 
philosophers have long wrestled with—from Aristotle to Locke and Rousseau. These 
questions include: “What are the foundations of legitimate rule? What is the nature of 
sovereignty? What is the most just form of government? On what grounds can rights be 
based?” (4). The basis of these questions assumes that rights are primal and natural, 
which, as most Foucauldian scholars would agree, contradicts one of Foucault’s most 
basic hypotheses: that individuals do not possess power or inherent rights. Rather than 
accepting the universality of intrinsic power and human rights, “Foucault argued to the 
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contrary that power is not something that is exchanged, given, or taken back, but rather is 
exercised and exists only in action” (4). While this exposition will not discuss legal rights 
and services for the disability community, though they do warrant their own studies, the 
notion of power as an exercised entity that organizes social groups is critical to 
developing a theoretical framework for analyzing the rhetoric of disability. Regarding the 
political questions Foucault found so problematic, the more pertinent task should be 
examining how and by what means power is exercised, to which a Foucauldian analysis 
would answer, “Power functions best when it is exercised through productive constraints, 
that is, when it enables subjects to act in order to constrain them” (4). Power has 
functioned in this way by forming the institution of disability, which has deemed certain 
bodies disabled and thus indoctrinated a population with a set of beliefs and practices. It 
should be noted, however, that though power can result in oppression, as it has 
functioned in the institution of disability, power itself is not inherently oppressive.  
Especially pertinent to my purposes are Foucault’s theories of “biopower” and the 
conception of the subject. Biopower, a technology of power, first emerged in late 
eighteenth-century Europe. Within this time frame, the first demographers began to 
statistically measure the phenomena of birth to death ratios, reproduction rates, and 
fertility, all of which became objects of knowledge for biopower and prompted the effort 
to control the population (4). In Tremain’s terms, “Bio-power takes as its object life 
itself, the life of the human qua living being, that is, the life of the human insofar as it is a 
living being” (4). As biopower emerged in this specific context and enacted new practices 
concerning medicine, hygiene, education, and charities, medical officials and those who 
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held positions of authority began to regulate and control the population and encourage 
certain norms. It is within this network of norms and regulation that power was exercised, 
thus enabling subjects to behave in certain ways. Biopower has extended from 
eighteenth-century Europe into modernity, as evidenced by the contemporary institution 
of disability. John Rajchman defines the current conception of policies and procedures 
implemented to regulate and control the disabled population as the “‘great complex idea 
of normality’ [which] has become the means through which to identify subjects and to 
make them identify themselves in order to make them governable” (qtd. in Tremain 6). 
As was in eighteenth-century Europe, the modern conception of disability is predicated 
on the notion of a normal body and a normal mind, which has organized and exerted 
social control over a portion of the human population.  
The subject, a byproduct of biopower and power at large, is also critical to the 
foundation of the rhetoric of disability. For Foucault, there are three modes of 
objectification in which human beings may become subjects, two of which directly relate 
to the institution of disability and its complex relations with knowledge and power.  In 
the second mode, the “dividing practices” as Foucault calls it, the subject is both divided 
inside himself or herself and divided from others, such as in Foucault’s examples of the 
mentally ill and the sane, the healthy and the sick, or the criminals and the non-criminals. 
At the same time, in the third mode, a person may transform himself or herself into a 
subject by recognizing and accepting one’s own identity within the knowledge-power 
relations of social institutions (“Subject and Power” 778). In both cases, the notion of the 
subject is housed within the question of power, as Foucault contends that “while the 
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human subject is placed in relations of production and of signification, he is equally 
placed in power relations which are very complex” (778). The subject informs the 
institution of disability in that the disabled person is both divided from non-disabled 
subjects by exterior forces—is subjugated—and may self-identify as a disabled person—
makes subject to. The disabled subject has been formed by the power exercised within the 
institution of disability, which both affects and is affected by knowledge and the 
formation of objects.  
Foucault’s notions of biopower and the subject culminate to form a theoretical 
framework for the rhetoric of disability—a discourse that has both emerged from the 
phenomenon of disability and formed the institution of disability. The rhetorical 
formation of objects has called into existence the disabled subject and fabricated a system 
for governing the disabled subject.  Tremain summarizes this system:  
These (and a host of other) practices, procedures, and policies have 
created, classified, codified, managed, and controlled social anomalies 
through which some people have been divided from others and 
objectivized as (for instance) physically impaired, insane, handicapped, 
mentally ill, retarded, and deaf. Foucault argued that, in recent times, 
practices of division, classification, and ordering around a norm have 
become the primary means by which to individualize people, who come to 
be understood scientifically, and who even come to understand themselves 
in this mode. (5-6)  
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While Tremain and other scholars have acknowledged these practices and classifications 
as oppressive forms of exercised power, a rhetorical analysis of those practices and 
classifications as components of the formation of disability as an object has not yet been 
produced. This exposition will examine the specific formation of disability as an object, 
as it has emerged through and from the Foucauldian notions of power and subjugation. 
Though not inherently oppressive, the ways in which power and subjugation have 
influenced the discursive tropes of the institution of disability have resulted in the 
oppression of people with disabilities. Recognizing the knowledge-power relations of 
these tropes will loosen the bounds of subjugation, which will benefit both those who 















This project will study the ways in which disability is measured, discussed, and 
controlled within various rhetorical situations. Specifically, I will consider the rhetorical 
structures of disability and their discursive tropes as they surface as artifacts in the 
English language within Western contemporary civilization, as the meaning and 
reception of disability differs across various cultural landscapes and eras. Additionally, I 
will frame these artifacts within the rhetorical structures that contribute to generating 
their meaning—specifically biopower and subjugation. The linguistic, paralinguistic, and 
material artifacts of disability and its schools of thought will be aggregated according to 
Foucault’s theory of the formation of objects. I will employ interchangeably both 
identity-first language (“disabled person”) and person-first language (“person with a 
disability”) in order to show the diversity and individual uniqueness of the disability 
experience, as well as to accommodate the varied preferences among members of the 











The objectives of this project will be aggregated according to Foucauldian 
discourse analysis via Foucault’s theory of the formation of objects as discussed in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, including the surfaces of emergence, authorities of 
delimitation, and grids of specification. For each of these planes, I will identify and 
explain its primary features and then analyze how and in what contexts these planes have 
contributed to forming the institution of disability. First, I will map the surfaces of 
emergence of disability by examining three rhetorical situations—the corporeal body, 
rhetorical space, and cognition—in which disability has emerged as the primary marker 
of deviance through the exercise of power and the pursuit and perpetuation of normalcy 
as an ideal. Next, I will analyze the authorities of delimitation, namely medical officials 
and the newly-formed disability community, who govern and organize the institution of 
disability by arranging the parameters and definitive characteristics of the institution of 
disability. I will disentangle the controversy of identity-first language and people-first 
language as it has manifested as a significant rhetorical artifact put in place by the 
authorities of delimitation.  Then, I will analyze the grids of specification, in which the 
various forms and degrees of disability are classified and hierarchized.  Lastly, I will 
provide a brief analysis of enunciative modalities and its implications for cognitive 
disability as a suggestion for further research regarding facilitated communication and 




Surfaces of Emergence 
According to Foucault, in order to demystify what has ruled the existence of 
objects of discourse, “First we must map the first surfaces of their emergence: show 
where these individual differences, which, according to the degrees of rationalization, 
conceptual codes, and types of theory… may emerge, and then be designated and 
analyzed” (Archaeology 1437). To discuss disability, it is thus necessary to trace the 
ideological and material conditions—surfaces—from which disability has been formed as 
a concept. By reviewing the contexts in which the phenomenon of the differently formed 
body and mind has been deemed disabled, we may then see how the differently formed 
body and mind have been subjugated through the exercise of power. Foucault makes the 
important qualification that “these surfaces of emergence are not the same for different 
societies, at different periods, and in different forms of discourse” (1437). Bodily values, 
standards of beauty, and expectations of corporeal functioning are not static paradigms 
for all cultures and all geographic locations, yet the understanding of disability as a 
differently formed body or mind is nearly universal. The degree to which a disabled 
person’s impairment is considered deviant or inferior, however, varies widely and is 
contingent upon the surfaces of emergence. Within Foucault’s example of the nineteenth-
century conception of madness as an object of discourse, the likely surfaces of emergence 
included “the family, the immediate social group, the work situation, the religious 
community (which are all normative, which are all susceptible to deviation, which all 
have a margin of tolerance and a threshold beyond which exclusion is demanded” (1437). 
For the institution of disability, the surfaces of emergence shift alongside time and 
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location. For this exposition, I consider the surfaces from which disability emerges in our 
current cultural landscape. Like the surfaces for Foucault’s example of madness, these 
surfaces—the corporeal body, environmental materiality, and cognition—are all 
normative, susceptible to deviation, and have only a margin of tolerance. From these 
three surfaces, disability emerges as a deviation or exclusion from the idealized position 
of normalcy.  
As Lennard Davis contends, the notion of the “norm” in Western civilization and 
language can be traced to a nineteenth-century French statistician who applied an 
astronomical system of measuring to human dimensions, which morphed into an 
idealized image of moral standing. While outliers and deviant behavior and appearance 
have existed in all cultures at all times, the notion of “the norm” did not enter European 
languages until this specific historical moment. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s notion of 
the normate—the idealized subject position from which one may exercise power and 
authority over other minority groups—situates the idea of normalcy as an active process, 
rather than a static identification. Jay Dolmage echoes this sentiment, as he regards the 
norm as both a position that is desired and the vehicle through which culture attempts to 
achieve the position. More simply, the norm “acts as a noun designating culture’s desire 
for homogeneity, and it also acts like a verb, in that this agenda is enforced… norms also 
ensure their own systemic enforcement” (21). The notion of normalcy, as both a desired 
subject position and the institutional and individual actions that move toward a desired 
norm, directly informs the surfaces of emergence that have rhetorically formed disability 
as an object.  
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 Much of the scholarship circulating within disability studies debates the 
importance of critiquing the social structures and cultural representations of the 
institution of disability, which arguably dismisses or negates the materiality of the 
disability experience and the physical barriers present in nature. From a rhetorical 
viewpoint, however, objects are formed by the very relation of their materiality and social 
presence—one does not exist without the other. The rhetorical study of disability as an 
institution must consider both the material conditions and ideological conditions under 
which disabled people have been subjugated. It is from these surfaces that disability 
emerges and “finds a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of 
giving it the status of an object—and therefore of making it manifest, nameable, and 
describable” (Archaeology 1437).   
The disabled corporeal body, as has been discussed, was the first designated 
violation of normalcy and continues in modernity. Shelly Tremain summarizes the 
conditions under which the disabled body was first defined, described, and named:  
The objectification of the body in eighteenth-century clinical discourse 
was one pole around which bio-power coalesced. As feminist historian 
Barbara Duden notes, in that historical context the modern body was 
created as the effect and object of medical examination, which could be 
used, abused, transformed, and subjugated. The doctor’s patient had come 
to be treated in a way that had at one time been conceivable only with 
cadavers. This new clinical discourse about “the body” created and caused 
to emerge new objects of knowledge and information and introduced new, 
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inescapable rituals into daily life, all of which became indispensable to the 
self-understandings, perceptions, and epistemologies of the participants in 
the new discourse. (“On the Government” 618) 
The institution of disability, as it is now conceived in Western culture, does not exist 
simply from the medical recognition of a differently formed body, but from the 
designation of the differently formed body as a deviation from normalcy. As Tremain 
explains, the ability to study the body—leading to objectification of the body—created 
new objects of knowledge and reified a dedication to ideal health, functioning, and 
appearance. Medical examination of the body, and the subsequent dissemination of 
medical discourse, forms the primary surface of emergence of disability: the corporeal 
body. It is from the plane of the corporeal body that bodily norms are constructed and 
sought after, which consequently exercises power over bodies that do not look like or 
function like the norm. Garland-Thomson, who largely focuses on feminist disability 
studies, calls this construction the “normate,” or “the corporeal incarnation of culture's 
collective, unmarked, normative characteristics” (“Integrating Disability” 10). With 
regard to disabled women, Garland-Thomson calls on Foucault’s notion of discipline in 
which bodies with any stigmatizing identity markers tied to ability, gender, race, 
ethnicity, or sexuality are subjected by societal pressure to assimilate to the norm, 
primarily through discourses of appearance and medicine (10). Whether from the 
discourse of a medical professional—usually with the mindset of solving the problem of 
the bodily impairment—or from societal pressure to adapt to an ideal of appearance or 
functioning, disabled bodies are designated as dysfunctional and inferior.  
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 Consequently, disability emerges from the surface of environmental materiality, 
in which the disabled body’s deviance is illuminated and perpetuated by material objects 
or a lack of material objects in everyday events. Roxanne Mountford calls the 
communicability from the presence or absence of objects “rhetorical space,” which she 
defines as “the geography of a communicative event, and, like all landscapes, may 
include both the cultural and material arrangement, whether intended or fortuitous, of 
space” (42). Rhetoricians are often concerned with the intellectual circumstances that 
inform discursive events, namely the credibility of the speaker, the logic and rationale of 
his or her message, the appeal to the audience’s emotions and personal constraints. The 
physical arrangement of the rhetorical situation, however, is not often observed as 
critically. Mountford argues that “the material—a dimension too little theorized by 
rhetoricians—often has unforeseen influence over a communicative event that cannot 
always be explained by cultural or creative intent” (42). This assertion holds true for the 
reality of environmental materiality when it encounters the differently formed body, 
whether within the clash of a disabled body and an opposing material circumstance or the 
absence of a material circumstance to accommodate the disabled body. The most obvious 
and prevalent manifestations of this surface of emergence are public spaces and 
transportation, educational spaces and classrooms, and places of business and retail. For 
members of the dominant group, those considered not to have corporeal disabilities, 
access to these spaces and the ability to thrive within them is not especially difficult. If a 
person is able to climb stairs without assistance, the lack of an elevator is not 
problematic. If a student can see and hear at the same capacity as an instructor, it is not 
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necessary to provide supplemental teaching materials. If a patron does not need 
assistance handling or purchasing an item at a store, employers would not be required to 
consider motor skills when designing store layouts. Yet, because the normate is a 
fictional ideal of perfect health, beauty, and functioning, many people do require 
alternative or assistive technologies in daily life. Rhetorical space may affirm these needs 
by equipping sidewalks with wheelchair-accessible ramps or widening building 
entryways to accommodate wheelchairs, for example. Contrarily, rhetorical space may 
further stigmatize the needs of disabled people by neglecting to incorporate or offer such 
accommodations, which is yet another form of exercised power and subjugation of the 
disability community.    
Foucault affirms that the relations between the surfaces of emergence, the 
authorities of delimitation, and the grids of specification are not intrinsic to the object. 
Objects are given meaning by the convergence of these planes but are not reflective of a 
natural state. In Foucault’s words, “They do not define its internal constitution, but what 
enables it to appear, to juxtapose itself with other objects, to situate itself in relation to 
them, to define its difference, its irreducibility, and even perhaps its heterogeneity, in 
short, to be placed in a field of exteriority” (Archaeology 1439). Physical space as a 
surface of emergence contributes to this definition of the formation of objects by situating 
the disabled body outside of the accepted and anticipated patron, student, or member of 
the public. The disabled body is not independently disabled; it is only disabled in relation 
to non-disabled. As the social model protests, the disabled body is only truly disabled 
when a person with an impairment collides with a situation in which his or her 
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impairment causes difficulty to oneself or to others, such as in physical spaces where an 
impairment is not accommodated. In this scenario, the norm of the non-disabled is 
enforced through the environment and its material conditions—rhetorical space—which 
subjugates any body that cannot conform. Mountford continues with the notion that 
“spaces have heuristic power over their inhabitants and spectators by forcing them to 
change both their behavior (walls cause us to turn right or left; skyscrapers draw the eye 
up) and, sometimes, their view of themselves” (50). From this surface, physical space 
subjugates people with disabilities by shaping thought; the inability to access a space, or 
to perform in the expected capacity in a space, communicates to disabled visitors that any 
deviant body is unwelcome, unwanted, and inferior. Physical spaces not only shape how 
people with disabilities may view themselves—are subjugated—but may also prompt 
non-disabled people to view disabled people as a burden that places unnecessary 
responsibility on business owners and city planners—make subject to. These 
consequences and features are not internal to the phenomenon of disability, as Foucault 
implies, but are generated from the object’s discursive relations.  
The third surface from which disability emerges is the cerebral plane: cognition. 
In some contexts, and for some rhetors, the disabled body includes the disabled mind. 
However, a major rift within disability studies is the consequential segregation of the 
body and mind and the further stigmatization of cognitive and/or intellectual disability. 
The social model, for example, advocates for the election or appointment of disabled 
people to positions of authority for the sake of visibility and representation. However, 
such goals and priorities effectively marginalize people whose impairments affect speech 
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or decision making. The disability movement prioritizes the disabled body but pays little 
regard to the disabled mind.   
 This discontinuity in disability advocacy is reinforced by rhetoricians’ dedication 
to effective communication; it is from this cerebral surface that disability emerges as a 
divergence from the ideal of meaningful, effective discourse. Even if effective discourse 
is generated by a non-disabled mind, it is thought to be delivered ideally from a non-
disabled body. Jay Dolmage notes, “[Plato wrote and] Socrates said, in the Phaedrus, that 
‘any discourse ought to be constructed like a living creature, with its own body, as it 
were; it must not lack either head or feet; it must have a middle and extremities so 
composed as to suit each other and the whole work’” (qtd. in Disability Rhetoric 24). 
Classically, good communication is only possible if it is generated, filtered, and delivered 
by a normal body and a normal mind. Neo-classically, such ideals and subsequent 
discrimination persist. Dolmage continues:  
The bodily ideal is the foundational metaphor for proper speech and 
writing… the message we take away from ‘the seat of civilization’ is that 
the speaker’s body and his words must conform to a limited set of norms. 
Ideal bodies produce ideal communication, and rhetoric polices nonideal 
bodies, or else betrays them. In the more narrow, normative classical 
tradition, those without the ability to speak and those without the ability to 
“control” their bodies have been omitted from considerations of rhetorical 
capacity. The mean becomes codified as a normate position, and thus we 
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get a picture of what bodies are allowed to be, to do, to look like, to 
express. (25) 
The field of rhetoric urges rhetors and interlocutors alike to assess the rhetorical 
situation—to listen closely, to respond appropriately, to speak authoritatively. Good 
rhetors produce ideal communication by considering the context of an utterance and 
entering into discourse appropriately and effectively. Rhetors with physical impairments 
may uphold the ideals of discursive practices, despite Plato’s insistence of a properly 
formed body, as long as his or her mind and intellectual capacity bears resemblance to the 
cognitive norm. However, rhetors with cognitive impairments deviate from cerebral 
normalcy, which thus excludes them from rhetorical capacity and denies them agency. If 
discourse is a primary vehicle by which individuals exercise power, as the field of 
rhetoric suggests, those with an impairment that affects the ability to produce and 
interpret discourse will remain subjugated so long as they are excluded from participating 










Authorities of Delimitation 
The second plane of Foucault’s formation of objects is the authorities of 
delimitation, which comprises the authoritative groups that legally and socially govern 
the population. For the example of madness, the authorities of delimitation were 
primarily the medical profession, the penal code, the law, religious authority, and literary 
and art criticism. The medical profession, however, was predominant in naming and 
defining this object, as Foucault explains, “Medicine (as an institution possessing its own 
rules, as a group of individuals constituting the medical profession, as a body of 
knowledge and practice, as an authority recognized by public opinion, the law, and 
government) became the major authority in society that delimited, designated, named, 
and established madness as an object” (1437). Disability as an institution has been 
governed—legally and socially—similarly to the nineteenth-century concept of madness. 
The clearest and most succinct evidence of this medical governing stems from the 
medical model of disability, which has been countered by the social model and, most 
recently, the minority model. To map the relevance of these models for the rhetoric of 
disability, I will examine the most pertinent and pressing rhetorical artifact that has 
emerged from these authorities of delimitation: the controversial discursive tropes of 
people-first language and its opposing identity-first language.  
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—the nation’s 
authoritative, federally-supported health protection agency—issued a public poster 
entitled “Communicating With and About People with Disabilities” that instructs the 
public to use people-first language, which, as the poster informs, “is used to speak 
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appropriately and respectfully about an individual with a disability [and] …emphasizes 
the person first, not the disability.” Some examples included on the poster offer the 
suggestions of “person with epilepsy” rather than “an epileptic”; “person who is blind” 
rather than “the blind”; “person who is hard of hearing” rather than “hearing impaired” or 
“suffers a hearing loss.” Other examples offer already existing and more readily accepted 
phrases, such as “person with a physical disability” instead of the demeaning terms 
“crippled,” “lame,” “deformed,” “invalid,” “spastic.” While it is generally agreed that 
pejorative terminology such as “crippled” or “deformed” is hostile and politically 
incorrect, the larger narrative of identity-first language versus person-first language is not 
unanimous and reflects the enduring tension between the competing authoritative models 
of disability, which stem from biopower and subjugation. 
 The Center for Disease Control and Prevention is not the only authoritative group 
that regulates and governs the descriptors of people with disabilities. The recent article 
“Person-First and Identity-first Language: Developing Psychologists’ Cultural 
Competence Using Disability Language,” clearly affirms that the American 
Psychological Association, a scientific and professional organization that represents the 
field of psychology, advocates for person-first language alongside the CDC. However, 
authors Dana Dunn and Erin Andrews qualify that psychologists should be receptive to 
identity-first language on a case-by-case basis in order to accommodate the desires of the 
disability community and to promote inclusion and understanding. Dunn and Andrews 
affirm the necessity of rhetorical sensitivity and the power of discourse in the medical 
profession, as they admit that “the words psychologists choose to use can shape their 
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thoughts and behaviors toward disabled persons in research and clinical settings, as well 
as in everyday life” (256). Though the APA’s entrance into the discussion of disability 
reflects the hard-won victory of visibility and awareness for the disability community, it 
simultaneously reflects the enduring presence of an authority of delimitation that 
exercises power over a population by defining and policing the appropriate manner of 
speaking about that population.  
Person-first language, supported and implemented by most medical professionals 
but rejected by many disability studies scholars and activists, was first championed by 
social psychologist Beatrice A. Wright, who specialized in rehabilitation psychology. For 
Wright, the use of “person with a disability” rather than “disabled person” prevents the 
equation of a person with his or her impairment and prioritizes a person’s humanity, 
rather than relegating him or her to a group of people whose lives and experiences may 
not be unilateral. Dunn and Andrews support Wright’s work, which ultimately led to the 
field’s acceptance of person-first language on the grounds that “one individual’s life with 
a given disability can differ markedly from that of another person with the same disability 
… [and] no one with a disability should be referred to in monolithic terms, because doing 
so effectively objectifies the person by focusing only on the impairment” (258). For valid 
reasons, the use of person-first language offers a humane response to the identity-first 
discursive tropes that initially emerged from the medical model of disability, which has 
historically oppressed the disability community. However, the intention and reception of 
these tropes has not remained static.  
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 Though enacted by a medical professional, the notion of person-first language 
builds upon the principles and ideas of the social model of disability—a conceptual 
model and school of thought originating in Britain that argues that the barriers of 
disability lie in culture, not in the disabled body. Unlike the medical model of disability, 
the social model was pioneered by a group of people with disabilities, though it has been 
controversial for the disability community. Primarily, the social model situates disability 
as a characteristic of a person that makes up a larger identity, rather than the primary 
defining characteristic of an individual. Furthermore, it rejects disability as a deficit or a 
medical problem that must be healed or cured. While the social model was initially met 
with support and success as a counter to the medical model that defined disability as a 
biological failure or deficit, it has not sustained itself as a universally accepted conceptual 
model. As Tom Shakespeare argues, “The social model is a blunt instrument for 
explaining and combating the social exclusion that disabled people face, and the 
complexity of our needs [but] … politically, the social model has generated a form of 
identity politics which has become inward looking and separatist” (202-203). The social 
model has succeeded in helping to reframe the larger cultural narrative of the obstacles of 
disability, but the model’s simplistic approach of shifting responsibility to culture itself 
has not been wholly effective. The subsequent manifestation of person-first language has 
endured similar turbulence, which brings to light the complex relations among the 
authorities of delimitation of disability.  
While the medical profession first established the medical model of disability, 
which set into motion the concept of disability as an urgent problem to heal or cure and 
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subsequently exercised power over the population, the social model and its supporters 
later emerged as another potential authority of delimitation that has similarly exercised 
power over its population. However, the lack of unification under the social model—
either by academic scholars or by laymen activists—complicates the institution of 
disability as a rhetorical formation. As Brenda Jo Brueggemann claims, identity-first 
language echoes the spirit of claiming and valuing disability, which allows the disabled 
person to choose his or her preferred identification terminology, rather than family 
members, employers, medical professionals, or other authorities deciding for the disabled 
person (“Disability Culture”).  
Dunn and Andrews acknowledge that “those who advocate for an identity-first 
approach argue that the person-first approach subtly implies that there is something 
inherently negative about disability and that use of constructions such as ‘with a 
disability’ or ‘with diabetes’ unnecessarily dissociates the disability from the person” 
(257). While person-first language prioritizes a person’s humanity and lived experience 
over a physical or cognitive impairment, identity-first language embraces the reality of 
living with a physical and cognitive impairment and places it at the forefront of the 
disability experience if an individual chooses to refer to himself or herself as a disabled 
person. The reclaiming of identity-first language has grown primarily from the most 
recent conceptual model: the minority model. While the medical model deems disability 
as a defect in need of treatment, and the social model wholly shifts responsibility of the 
obstacles of disability on the hegemonic nondisabled population, the minority model 
situates disability as a variety of difference and diversity alongside other diverse social 
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groups. The major goal of the minority model is to combat “ableism,” which is the large-
scale preference for non-disabled people in conjunction with daily microagressions that 
target people with disabilities (Yuker). Identity-first language is one of the minority 
model’s primary methods of pushing back against ableism in that it rejects a dominant 
group, such as the medical or psychological profession, from naming and defining the 
disability experience. As Dunn and Andrews summarize, “The minority model viewpoint 
is a disability activist counterresponse to the historical oppression and marginalization of 
disabled people, which can lead to internalization of inferiority and self-deprecation” 
(259). Identity-first language, then, is not simply a reordering of words but a reclamation 
of identity from a dominant, governing group—in this case, from medical professionals. 
The role of discourse in this particular cultural artifact displays the implications of 
language use in organizing social groups, a process in which power is exercised.  
In dissecting the existence of objects of discourse, Foucault clarifies that the 
surfaces of emergence, the authorities of delimitation, and the grids of specification do 
not provide objects. Discourse is not a conveyor of preexisting meaning but rather a 
facilitator in generating meaning. The formation of objects does offer several planes from 
which objects may appear, but Foucault asks, “What relations exist between them? Why 
this enumeration rather than the other? What defined and closed group does one imagine 
one is circumscribing in this way? And how can one speak of a ‘system of formation’ if 
one knows only a series of heterogeneous determinations, lacking attributable links and 
relations?” (Archaeology 1438). Within the context of disability, the emergence of 
disability as an object did not occur from a medical professional recognizing or 
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discovering a disabled body or mind, as the disabled body or mind as we now perceive it 
did not exist until the positive conditions of these planes converged. Foucauldian 
discourse analysis asserts that the formation of objects depends on the relations between 
these planes, which disallows any authority of delimitation from being considered wholly 
responsible for the institution we now refer to as disability. It is within the complex 
relations among the surfaces of emergence, its various authorities of delimitations, and 
grids of specification that disability has been formed as an object.  
While the authorities of delimitation are not the sole figures in the formation of 
the institution of disability, they are integral in tracing the exercise of power over, and the 
subjugation of, people with disabilities. The role of the medical profession in governing 
people with disabilities is clear in its subjugation of the disability community, as it often 
functions as a legal authority in making medical decisions, providing medical services, 
and instructing how and in what contexts to refer to members of the disability 
community. This authority objectivizes the subject, aligning with Foucault’s “dividing 
practices,” in which the subject is divided inside himself and divided from others. 
However, the subjects of this medical governing have emerged as another authority of 
delimitation and have subsequently engaged in their own subjugation. The minority 
model, the most succinct representation of this school of thought, is predicated on these 
principles: 
Disability represents difference, a neutral term for a continuum of being, 
not deviance, because there is no commonly agreed upon definition for 
normal. Identity-first language is also linked to disability culture, which 
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promotes connection, camaraderie, and shared purpose among the diverse 
range of people with disabilities; it entails pride in being associated with 
the largest minority group in the United States, as well as motivation to 
positively and constructively address their own social, civil, political, and 
economic needs. (Dunn and Andrews 259) 
As this manifesto of the minority model attests, the identity of disability is undergoing a 
revolution as a source of pride and positive social construction. Such identification 
illustrates Foucault’s third mode of subjugation: “the way a human being turns himself 
into a subject” (“Subject and Power” 778). In this mode, people may subject themselves 
by identifying as subjects of a certain domain. The minority model and its reclamation of 
identity-first language illustrate how individuals may come to know themselves as 
subjects of the domain of disability; within this mode, however, the subjects have 
emerged as the authority of delimitation in their own subjugation. By consciously 
choosing the linguistic construction of “disabled person” over “person with a disability,” 
the subjects of the domain of disability may exercise power while further instilling the 
formation of disability as an object.  
 It is important to distinguish the authority of disability studies scholars from the 
authority of the disability community. People with disabilities who are not also disability 
studies scholars may not have the same opportunities to exercise power as those who 
have access to publishing and speaking engagements. These voices, whom I consider 
alongside disability studies scholars as an authority of delimitation, are valid and vital to 
studying the rhetoric of disability. Amy Sequenzia, a non-verbal autistic author, 
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contributes to Ollibean.com, a website well-known in the disability community as a 
resource for raising children with disabilities. In her discussion of person-first language 
and its relation to ableism, she argues: 
If you are not Disabled and you are demanding the use of Person First 
Language (PFL), you are being ableist. If you are Disabled and you are 
demanding that other Disabled people use Person First Language, you are 
being ableist. If you are Disabled and want to use Person First Language 
when referring to yourself, I will respect that. I will also respect your right 
to demand that other people use Person First Language when referring to 
you. [But] … I want to debunk the notion that by using PFL society treats 
us better. If anything, it helps with the stigmatization of Disabled people. 
Instead of “seeing” us, society ignores us, we become “voiceless” and 
“invisible.” 
In accord with many disability studies scholars, Sequenzia rejects the notion that person-
first language prioritizes the humanity of a person over a disability. In actuality, this 
ordering only renders a disabled person’s existence more palatable for a non-disabled 
person by nulling the components of a person’s body or mind that make up his or her 
identity. Even further, suggesting that society at large should subscribe to a single 
semantic structure ignores uniqueness and individuality by dismissing the desires and 
preferences of the individual disabled person. Continued support of person-first language, 
in Sequenzia’s words, is ableist because the disabled community has “already said that 
respecting us means listening to our preferences, instead of demanding that everyone uses 
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a language that we reject. You make it all about you, your preferences, your choices.” 
Though many who support person-first language do so from a place of goodwill, with the 
intention to validate a person’s humanity rather than only see an impairment, continuing 
to prescribe person-first language reinstates the hegemonic authority of delimitation that 
governs this minority group—and makes subject to. However, the subjugated, who have 
emerged from disability studies and from the disability community as an authority of 
delimitation, acknowledge the complex scenario that Sequenzia defends: it depends on 
the rhetor. If an individual prefers to be called a “person with a disability” rather than a 
“disabled person,” his or her wishes should be carried out by other individuals with or 
without disabilities, regardless of the disability community’s general preference for 
identity-first language.   
 The dilemma of identity-first versus person-first language as an effect of 
disability’s authorities of delimitation exemplifies the role of language in forming objects 
of discourse, which then shapes identities and arranges social hierarchies. Though Dunn 
and Andrews represent the medical profession as an authority of delimitation that has 
contributed to the subjugation of the disability community by prescribing person-first 
language, they make an important qualification: “Word choice, labels and the like, 
whether written or spoken, become a challenge because it matters who is doing the 
representing, who is being represented, and with whom exchange is occurring. Moreover, 
are people with disabilities involved in the writing or speaking activities?” (260-261). 
Every rhetorical situation demands the awareness of, and sensitivity to, its interpretive 
occasion, which precludes a universal prescriptive grammar of referring to people with 
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disabilities. A rhetor’s constraints must be considered alongside an audience’s constraints 
in order to disempower the discursive tropes that have unjustly subjugated the disability 
community. However, when considering the reality of cognitive and intellectual 
disabilities, which organize disability along Foucault’s grids of specification, the 



















Grids of Specification 
The third and final condition for existence that forms objects of discourse are the 
grids of specification, which Foucault describes as “the systems according to which the 
different ‘kinds of madness’ are divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified, 
derived from one another as objects of psychiatric discourse” (1437). Within this same 
example of madness, these grids of differentiation were the soul, the body, the life and 
history of individuals, and the interplay of neuropsychological correlations. For the 
institution of disability, the grids of specification are varied and nuanced, both in their 
physical or cognitive embodiments and in their discursive descriptions. From a larger 
schematic view, all impairments fall within the framework of disability if they symbolize 
any sort of difference or deviance from the idealized norm of human functioning, whether 
corporeal or cognitive. However, the terminology imposed by medical officials, the 
general public, and people with disabilities alike designate and differentiate both the 
kinds of disability and their degrees of severity. The terms impairments and disabilities 
are uttered most frequently within disability studies and in the general public; however, 
the more explicit grids of specification of the institution reveal a complex network of 
conditions, syndromes, disorders, illnesses, and injuries. An illness or injury connotes a 
temporary impairment that altered a once “normal” body or mind that may still be healed 
or cured by medical intervention. Contrarily, a condition, syndrome, or disorder implies a 
fixed state of deviant being that develops over time, is genetically predisposed, or 
manifests as a result of biological variation. Medical officials function as the primary 
authority of delimitation that designates these grids of specification, either in identifying 
57  
a new biological anomaly through research or in diagnosing an individual with a 
preexisting impairment. Though these grids continue to expand and shrink 
simultaneously, as new anomalies surface while medical treatments and devices are 
produced to treat or accommodate those anomalies, the various grids generally fall within 
two camps: corporeal and cognitive.  
While the specific kinds of disability and their levels of severity are unique and 
worthy of analysis, I will focus on the great divide between physical disabilities and 
mental disabilities. As discussed earlier in this analysis, the larger narrative of the 
disability studies movement, academically and socially, is to fight for recognition of the 
disability community as an oppressed group and to weave disabled people back into 
society. Consequently, however, this narrative has further marginalized cognitively 
disabled people whose impairments prevent them from participating in discourse 
alongside physically disabled activists and researchers. The field of rhetoric echoes the 
stigmatization of cognitively disabled people by prioritizing ideal communication that 
may occur only within a normed rhetorical situation. There has been, however, 
significant traction in the name of “Neurodiveristy,” in that people with autism, ADHD, 
or similar neurological conditions are recognized as natural variations of the human 
condition (Robison). While conditions such as these certainly fall along the continuum of 
disability and its subsequent subjugation, I maintain that issues of agency and subjugation 
are more complicated and less represented for cognitive disabilities that affect the 
understanding of discourse in addition to the production and dissemination of discourse. 
Licia Carlson, author of “Docile Bodies, Docile Minds: Foucauldian Reflections on 
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Mental Retardation,” is one of few scholars to consider critically Foucault’s notion of 
biopower and subjugation with regard to severe cognitive disability (While I prefer and 
employ the term “severe cognitive disability” for my own analysis, I will employ “mental 
retardation” when referencing Carlson’s scholarship.)  
Severe cognitive disability houses many syndromes and conditions—as broad as 
learning disabilities and developmental delays and as specific as Down syndrome, all of 
which vary in their own degrees of severity. Carlson traces the history of the 
development of the concept of mental retardation and argues that “multiple institutions, 
practices, and discourses constituted mental retardation as an object of knowledge” (135). 
The overarching goal of this exposition has been to situate disability—as a broad 
institution—as a purely rhetorical object in and of itself. Carlson’s study of mental 
retardation as its own separate object of knowledge displays the reliability of Foucault’s 
grids of specification as one plane from which objects are formed in conjunction with 
surfaces of emergence and authorities of delimitation. At the same time, the necessity of 
isolating mental retardation as a distinct classification and grid of specification, separate 
from corporeal disabilities, bolsters the segregation of the mind and body within both 
disability studies and within rhetoric.  
Carlson calls upon a historical moment and material artifact—surfaces—from 
which the concept of mental retardation emerged: the creation of live-in institutions for 
the “feebleminded” and the creation of IQ tests (136). Institutions and IQ tests together 
created an organizational structure for assessing, diagnosing, and governing people with 
severe cognitive disability (who were at this time in the nineteenth century referred to as 
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“feebleminded” or “idiots”). As a result of institutions and IQ testing, the medical 
authority of delimitation developed new theories for understanding this new object of 
knowledge, which Carlson summarizes as the quantitative definition of disease, which 
countered the previous qualitative definition. The understanding of mental retardation 
shifted in this way: 
The belief in the curability, or at least improvability of “most idiots,” is 
grounded in a conception of idiocy as a quantitative, not a qualitative 
difference: a question of degree or intensity, not kind. “Idiots” were 
considered to be human beings “like the rest of us”; the “idiot” was simply 
at a lower level of development (be it physical, intellectual, or moral). 
Alongside this quantitative picture, however, we find the depiction of 
“idiots” as qualitatively different, that is, as a separate kind. “Idiots” are 
viewed as animal-like, subhuman, or of a different race altogether. 
Generally, the most severe cases of idiocy were used to illustrate these 
qualitative differences. They were often described as human only in form, 
empty shells of humanity. (138-139) 
As Carlson explains, in this moment the degree to which an individual was able to 
rationalize or to communicate reasonable thoughts directly influenced his or her level of 
deviance and, thus, his or her level of humanity. The organizational systems of 
institutions and IQ tests helped to systematically categorize the various kinds of 
disability—the grids of specification—which has further marginalized certain populations 
of the disability community. 
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 The diagnosis of and placement of disabled people who were “feebleminded” in 
medical institutions are yet another form of exercised power over a population that 
deviates from the norm—in this case, the cognitive or cerebral norm. Within these 
institutions, staff aimed to educate and rehabilitate people in order to become productive 
members of society, unless their disability was so qualitatively different that they were 
unable to change or improve. Carlson calls upon Foucault’s notion of discipline and 
punishment, in that “while the ‘feebleminded’ were objects of various techniques and 
practices (for example, documentation, examinations, punishments), they were also 
called upon to take part in the workings of this disciplinary apparatus: they were taught to 
be productive so that they could work within the institution” (144). In this light, 
individuals were subjugated and, if their cognitive impairment allowed, turned 
themselves into subjects by becoming productive members of the domain. Whether an 
individual was considered quantitatively different (a lower functioning level of cognition) 
or qualitatively different (a separate kind of functioning outside of human cognition 
altogether), people with cognitive disabilities emerged as a grid of specification along the 
continuum of disability and became subjects who both came to act in certain prescribed 
ways and were acted upon by medical officials (149).  
 The historical conditions of institutions and IQ tests are relevant for mapping this 
grid of specification for disability, especially regarding how it has emerged as an object 
of knowledge in front of the medical gaze. I am most concerned, however, with the 
contemporary conception of cognitive disability, especially regarding its implications for 
the field of rhetoric. Foucault argues that psychopathalogy, the systematized discipline 
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surrounding the emergence of madness as an object, was and is constantly in motion, 
subject to new discoveries and subsequent corrections of previous thought. although its 
system of formation remains stable. However, the clarification must be made that “it is 
not the objects that remain constant, nor the domain that they form; it is not even their 
point of emergence or their mode of characterization; but the relation between the 
surfaces on which they appear, on which they can be delimited, on which they can be 
analyzed and specified” (Archaeology 1440). Political, economic, and social conditions 
(surfaces of emergence) directly affect the voices who may speak of objects (authorities 
of delimitation) and define how, who, and in what contexts those objects exist and are 
differentiated (grids of specification). The relations among these planes are the constant 
generators of rhetorically formed objects. Within the context of disability, the phenomena 
of genetic anomalies, biological differences, and acquired illnesses or injuries are 
perpetually changing. They are not constant, but the relations among the planes that 
converge to form their discursive existence are. Thus, we must draw our focus to the 
planes that inform the discussion of objects, rather than the objects themselves. 
Considering the historical conditions in which objects of knowledge first appeared is 
necessary, but Foucauldian discourse analysis is less concerned with lexical and semantic 
structures, and the materiality in which they initially appeared, than it is with the 
designation of those structures in specific and systematized formations. When we 
perform such analysis, “one sees the loosening of the embrace, apparently so tight, of 
words and things, and the emergence of a group of rules proper to discursive practice. 
These rules define not the dumb existence of a reality, nor the canonical use of a 
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vocabulary, but the ordering of objects” (1441). As this exposition has aimed to present, 
this ordering of objects as disabled or non-disabled, rather than the plain recognition of 
the phenomena of corporeal or cognitive difference, is what has formed the present 
conception of disability.  
   Additionally, Foucault makes the important qualification that “what we are 
concerned with here is not to neutralize discourse … but on the contrary to maintain it in 
its consistency, to make it emerge in its own complexity” (1440). Discursive formations, 
like the notion of power, are not inherently oppressive. The oppression of people with 
disabilities is not a direct result of the existence of discourse but of the use of discourse to 
subjugate certain people so that they may come to know themselves as separate and 
deviant. As discussed in the authorities of delimitation section, the recent dilemma of 
identity-first versus person-first language displays the power of discourse in shaping 
identities, which illustrates Foucault’s goal of analysis to view discourse itself as a 
practice. For disability, members of this community have recently begun to take part in 
that discourse, often in the form of reclamation of the institution’s discursive tropes or in 
legal discourse that has altered the environmental materiality in order to accommodate 
differently formed bodies. One of the victories of the disability studies movement and 
activism has resulted in the deinstitutionalization of sites similar to those Licia Carlson 
discusses in addition to the shifts away from terms such as “mentally retarded,” “idiocy,” 
and “feebleminded.” Despite these successes, the reality for individuals with severe 
cognitive disability has remained largely unchanged, if not further marginalized.  Those 
with cognitive impairments that prevent them from taking part in discourse have been 
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Current scientific research regarding facilitated communication for individuals 
with cognitive disabilities has received much attention but not without philosophical 
scrutiny. Facilitated communication may take many different forms, as it suits the 
individual person’s unique impairment and level of severity, but it is premised on 
physical and/or emotional support provided by a second party in order to aid an 
individual to communicate, perhaps through typing, holding a disabled person’s hands, or 
pointing to pictures. Douglas Biklen reports that facilitated communication has been 
especially helpful for individuals with autism or other impairments that affect the ability 
to perform motor tasks. When data was recorded, individuals were noted to have 
expressed “rational,” sophisticated thoughts with the aid of facilitated communication 
(Erevelles 46). However, the notion of facilitated communication as authentic discourse 
has been controversial, as critics have scrutinized the scientific objectivity of these 
expressed thoughts on the grounds that if an autistic individual cannot communicate 
consistently without facilitated communication in various situations, then the validity and 
reliability of facilitated communication should be questioned. In other words, the role of 
the author in producing these alternative modes of discourse is unclear. With these 
considerations in mind, Nirmala Erevelles poses important questions that may inform 
further research: “Are people who have been identified as cognitively disabled competent 
(or incompetent) to represent themselves? Is it possible that these people can have 
observable physiological, cognitive, or behavioral disabilities, but also exhibit behavior 
and thinking that could be termed ‘normal,’ that is, rational?” (47)  
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Erevelles situates the controversy of facilitated communication as the debate 
between the humanist subject (which is predicated on pre-existing notions of Self, Truth, 
Reason) and the poststructuralist subject (who comes into being through language). As 
demonstrated in this analysis, I argue for the poststructuralist subject, especially 
considering my position that disability as an object (and the subsequent formation of the 
subject) has been formed by a network of ideologies and materialities. If we consider the 
poststructuralist subject as Foucault does, in that “subjectivity is not an originary force, 
not an originator of speech act and ideas, but rather is the constituted effect of knowledge 
regimes (discourses),” then the integrity of facilitated communication may be considered 
as a valid and authentic form of communication, regardless of whether a rhetor 
communicates independently or with the aid of another party (Erevelles 48). 
Furthermore, I regard Erevelles’s questions within Foucault’s framework in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge. Though the surfaces of emergence, authorities of 
delimitation, and grids of specification are critical to analyzing the formation of objects, 
the enunciative modalities (in the chapter following “The Formation of Objects” in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge) should be considered for further analysis regarding severe 
cognitive disability and rhetoric. 
While studying objects of discourse necessitates the study of contextual 
information that gives rise to those objects, the enunciative modalities of discourse, 
which are concerned with the speaker and his or her qualifications, the institutional sites 
from which the speaker produces discourse, and the speaker’s subject position and 
relation to the object, should also be considered. Foucault’s notion of enunciative 
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modalities—the relations regarding the authenticity and authority of the speaking 
subject—offer a framework that rhetoricians may use to enter the discussion regarding 
facilitated communication for people with cognitive disabilities. Foucault’s definition of 
enunciative modalities centers on the medical official as the speaking subject, arguing 
that “medical statements cannot come from anybody; their value, efficacy, even their 
therapeutic powers, and, generally speaking, their existence as medical statements cannot 
be dissociated from the statutorily defined person who has the right to make them, and to 
claim for them the power to overcome death and suffering” (1442). Though in this sense 
the subject refers to a medical authority of delimitation, we may apply these same 
principles to the authority and authenticity of the cognitively disabled person as a 
speaking subject—considering subjects are formed both by those who make subject to 
and those who are subjugated. If subjects are formed through knowledge-power 
relations, it is possible for a subject who does not produce conventional utterances to 
exercise agency (and, thus, power) through the vehicle of facilitated communication. This 
is only possible by a retheorizing of agency, which will require new considerations of the 
rhetorical situation—namely the ethos of a rhetor and/or interlocutor. With continued 
scholarship, I believe that rhetoricians may open up the normed rhetorical situation to 
accommodate diverse forms of communication and may consider them as valid and as 
worthy of analysis as conventional rhetorical situations. If we consider facilitated 
communication in tandem with Foucault’s enunciative modalities (who is speaking, the 
institutional sites from which discourse is produced, and the speaker’s relational position 
to the object), we may begin to retheorize agency and the exercise of power for 
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individuals with cognitive disabilities. This will ultimately make way for more inclusive, 























Discourse is not a reflection or a translation of a phenomenon. Rather, it gives 
meaning to an observable phenomenon. In Foucault’s words, “Discourse is not the 
majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the 
contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with 
himself may be determined” (Archaeology 1444). The subject is formed as an effect of 
dispersed language and material conditions, rather than a pre-existing entity that simply 
must then be named and categorized. As this exposition has aimed to elucidate, we have 
come to know the disabled person as a subject of the domain of disability, which has 
come into being through discursive knowledge-power relations. My scholarly purpose for 
this project has been to display the meaning-making power of discourse, which may 
manifest in the weaponization of knowledge and power to unjust ends. My personal goal, 
however, has been to serve as an advocate for those whose voices have been silenced.  
Despite my analytical positioning of disability as a rhetorical formation, to argue 
that a disabled person’s reality is no different than a nondisabled person’s reality is futile; 
impairments—corporeal or cognitive—are often physically painful and emotionally 
arduous, regardless of their rhetorical nature. One may argue that a discourse analysis 
does little to alter or improve a disabled person’s daily life. This project may mean very 
little for an individual who is unable to read or interpret its arguments. It is true that 
academic study does not alleviate pain or tangibly improve quality of life. Even so, I 
contend that when we study the rhetorical nature of knowing and being, we begin to 
understand more deeply our shared humanity and to protest more ardently the injustices 
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that afflict us all, or those we care about, in some capacity. When we illuminate areas of 
our cultural fabric that have been neglected if not actively shunned, and represent and 
support the people who are members of these communities, we create opportunities for 
civil discussion and engagement. Regardless of ideology or occupation, it is the civic 
duty of all humanity to speak out against oppression. If we are to take such action, we 
must first engage in discussion. I find Bill Hughes phrases it best: 
Nondisabled people require disabled people in order to live in the 
minimum security of that curious and liminal ontological space that is 
called “the human condition.” For many people, the frailty of that 
condition is troublesome. For many people, impairment represents the 
tragedy that they hope they will never have to face. Disabilism and ageism 
amount to the failure to recognize and to celebrate the frailties of existence 
to which we are all subject. Few of us will escape impairment. The failure 
on the part of nondisabled people to recognize impairment in themselves, 
and to recognize this way of being-in-the-world as one of the privileges of 
life itself, is one of the tragedies of modern culture that needs to be 
bemoaned. (89) 
 As both a rhetorician and a disability advocate and ally, I argue that if we are to 
move toward a more just, equitable society, we must understand our roles as meaning-
makers and the consequences of our thoughts, words, and actions—our discourse. It is 
not enough, however, to recognize social injustice and to acknowledge that it has been 
rhetorically formed; we must call upon our shared humanity and reconstitute our cultural 
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idol of normalcy, reassign the meaning of disability, and make way for new, diverse 
rhetorics. While disability studies has opened up and validated the discussion of disability 
as academic inquiry, additional scholarship is needed that critically evaluates the 
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